Dmitry Chebotarev

Assistant Professor of Finance,
IU Bloomington Kelley School of Business




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Research interests : financial intermediation, banking, risk management, repo, household finance.

Working Papers

The Paradox of Conservative Haircuts

Collateral requirements affect counterparty selection. I show empirically that conservative Central Counterparty (CCP) repo haircuts push low-risk borrowers away from the CCP and into the Over-the-counter (OTC) repo market. When a CCP increases repo haircuts, its policy change applies to all participants uniformly, but most strongly affects borrowers whose funding constraints are binding. Affected borrowers with high credit ratings are more likely to switch to borrowing over the counter due to the risk preferences of OTC repo lenders. As a result, conservatively high haircuts induce negative selection in the CCP repo market, potentially threatening its stability.

Pricing Repo: a Model of Haircuts and Rates

I study the effect of collateral quality on repo rates and haircuts. I build a model of repo, where value-at-risk and expected shortfall arise endogenously as sufficient statistics of the collateral quality, that is, its return distribution. Although a higher expected shortfall increases both haircuts and repo rates, a higher value-at-risk leads to a larger haircut and a lower rate. I confirm the model’s predictions using novel over-the-counter deal-level repo data from Moscow Exchange. Additionally, I empirically document that borrowers’ liquidity needs (and not the borrowers’ credit risk) drive the interchangeability between repo rates and haircuts, consistent with the model.

Rich and Responsible: Is ESG a Luxury Good? (with Steffen Andersen, Fatima Zahra Filali Adib, and Kasper Meisner Nielsen )

We study whether investors perceive responsible investments (i.e., investments in assets with environmental or social benefits) as a luxury good. We exploit windfall wealth due to inheritances from parental deaths to obtain plausibly exogenous variation in wealth. We show that windfall wealth increases likelihood of holding responsible mutual funds and green stocks. Our findings indicate that both supply factors (e.g., bank advice) and demand factors (e.g., preferences) play a role in shaping allocations to responsible investments. Notably, inheritors with a history of charitable donations exhibit a stronger response, which emphasizes the influence of a 'warm glow' effect on portfolio formation.

Work in progress

A Breath of Change: Can Personal Exposures Drive Green Preferences? (with Steffen Andersen, Fatima Zahra Filali Adib, and Kasper Meisner Nielsen )

Are investors’ preferences for responsible investing affected by their idiosyncratic personal experiences? Using a comprehensive dataset for hospital visits and the information on portfolio holdings by retail investors in Denmark, we show that when an investor’s child is diagnosed with a respiratory disease, the investor decreases (increases) portfolio weights of “brown” (“green”) stocks but does not alter their holdings of ESG funds. Consistent with parents attributing respiratory diseases to air pollution, we find no effects for non-respiratory diseases. The results are stronger for more severe diseases and are entirely driven by parents who live with their children.

Pricing Information: Experimental Evidence (with Dmitrii Pugachev)

We study information pricing in a laboratory experiment where subjects predict the next observation of a random walk process. At each step they can buy a signal that may be useful for making predictions. Participants know the parameters of the process, but not the informativeness of the signal. We find that subjects correctly price precise and imprecise signals, but overprice signals of average precision. This pattern persists even when the true precision level is revealed. We show that when participants do not buy the signal, they display optimism and use momentum and reversal strategies in forecasts. Although buying the signals spares them from these biases, relatively more biased participants do not value the signals higher than their peers.